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How New Is the New Textualism? 
Jeffrey Rosen* 
In light of Chief Justice Roberts‟s tie-breaking vote to uphold the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) as a legitimate exercise 
of Congress‟s taxing power,1 it is worth asking whether the arguments of 
liberal textualists played any role in shaping the historic decision. After 
all, an amicus brief filed by Jack Balkin and other constitutional law 
scholars2 had argued that the mandate is clearly authorized by Congress‟s 
authority under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution “[t]o lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”3 Did 
Balkin‟s brief help persuade Chief Justice Roberts to uphold the Act? 
Although the brief may have helped, it is hard to imagine that it played a 
decisive role. Balkin and other liberal textualist scholars had also argued 
that that the Framers of the Constitution intended Congress to be able to 
regulate interstate commerce to respond to situations that arose under the 
Articles of Confederation, in which the inability of states to coordinate 
their economic and defense policy led to collective action problems whose 
effects spilled across state borders.4 And yet that argument failed to 
persuade Chief Justice Roberts to uphold the ACA as a legitimate exercise 
of Congress‟s power under the Commerce Clause. It seems more likely 
that Chief Justice Roberts‟s decision to uphold the Act under the taxing 
but not the commerce power reflected his longstanding commitment—first 
expressed during his first term as Chief5—to persuade his colleagues to 
put the institutional interests of the Court above their own ideological 
 
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. 
1. See Nat‟l Fed‟n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
2. See Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Minimum 
Coverage Provision), Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No 11-398); see also Jack M. 
Balkin, The Health-Care Mandate Is Clearly a Tax—and Therefore Constitutional, ATLANTIC, May 4, 
2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/the-health-care-mandate-is-clearly-a-tax 
-0151-and-therefore-constitutional/256706 (outlining the “tax argument”). 
3. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
4. See Jeffrey Rosen, One Simple Argument Could Have Saved Obamacare. Too Bad Verrilli 
Didn’t Make It, NEW REPUBLIC, March 20, 2012, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/102203/supreme 
-court-obamacare-verrilli. 
5. See Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC, Jan.-Feb. 2007, http://www.theatlantic.com 
/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559. 
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agendas.6 
Although Balkin‟s argument may not have been decisive, it did help to 
increase the range of options the Chief Justice had at his disposal as he 
deliberated about ways of advancing the Court‟s long-term institutional 
interests. And Balkin‟s brief, like his book, Living Originalism,7 
represents a growing constitutional movement among liberal activists and 
legal scholars that James Ryan has called the “new textualism.”8 The 
movement seeks to beat conservatives at their own game by insisting that 
arguments about the text, history, and structure of the Constitution often 
lead to liberal rather than conservative results. The new textualist 
movement has had some notable successes in helping to persuade 
conservative Justices and judges to endorse liberal arguments—in cases 
ranging from environmental protection9 to lower court victories for the 
health care mandate.10 But it is being strenuously resisted by an older 
generation of liberal legal scholars,11 who fear that addressing 
conservative Justices in terms they can understand will make it harder to 
defend landmark Warren and Burger Court liberal precedents such as Roe 
v. Wade.12 
As a strategic matter, the ACA decision shows that liberals would do 
well to embrace new textualist analysis as a way of expanding the range of 
arguments they can use to persuade conservative Justices to embrace 
liberal results. But despite its strengths in providing a common language 
for liberals and conservatives to debate constitutional issues in common 
terms, the new textualism, as practiced by Balkin and others, also has 
limitations stemming from its ambivalent relation to the constitutional text 
and from its tendency to define the text and history at such a high level of 
abstraction that the new textualism is often hard to distinguish from old-
fashioned Warren Court living constitutionalism. For example, although 
Balkin insists that the Privileges or Immunities Clause might be a better 
textual home for privacy rights than the Due Process Clause, his method 
of identifying unenumerated privileges or immunities seems very similar 
to the substantive due process methodology deployed by Justice Blackmun 
in Roe v. Wade. 
Ultimately, however, the success or failure of the new textualism will 
 
6. See Jeffrey Rosen, Big Chief, NEW REPUBLIC, July 13, 2012, http://www.tnr.com 
/article/politics/magazine/104898/john-roberts-supreme-court-aca. 
7. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
8. James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 1523 (2011). 
9. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
10. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 
F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring). 
11. See Jeffrey Rosen, Constitution Avenue, NEW REPUBLIC, June 8, 2012, http://www.tnr.com 
/article/politics/103943/magazine/constitution-avenue-supreme-court?page=0,3. 
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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depend on the ability of liberals to stop squabbling about constitutional 
methodology and to agree on the substantive values that they believe the 
Constitution protects. History shows that the most effective Supreme 
Court Justices, such as Justice Brandeis, were successful because of their 
ability to combine a vigorous substantive defense of the justice of the laws 
they upheld with willingness to be constrained by the constitutional text. 
Justice Brandeis was willing to strike down laws when they clashed with 
the textual prohibitions of the First and Fourth Amendments, translated in 
light of new technologies.13 He insisted on deference to democratic 
decisions when there was no clear textual argument for invalidation.14 But 
unlike Justice Holmes, who had contempt for the progressive economic 
regulations he upheld,15 Justice Brandeis defended those regulations as a 
rational and necessary response to the values he insisted the Constitution 
protects—namely, suspicion of the “curse of bigness,” whether threatened 
by government or private corporations.16 To be similarly effective today, 
liberal Justices cannot simply embrace the constitutional textualism that 
Balkin champions; they also need to embrace a substantive liberal 
vision—such as Justice Brandeis‟s crusading economic populism—that 
mobilized citizens and legislators have enacted into law. 
I. THE NEW TEXTUALISM: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
How effective has the new textualism been in persuading conservative 
Justices to favor liberal results? Its success as a litigation strategy can be 
measured by the victories of the leading new textualist advocacy group, 
the Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC), and its predecessor, the 
Community Rights Counsel (CRC), both founded by Douglas T. 
Kendall.17 Starting in 1997, CRC and CAC filed briefs emphasizing that 
constitutional text and history should lead the court to uphold 
environmental laws, health and safety laws, campaign finance laws, and 
other regulations. CRC and CAC have had some striking successes before 
the Supreme Court, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council case 
in 2002,18 Massachusetts v. EPA in 2007,19 and Padilla v. Kentucky20 in 
 
13. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
14. See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
15. See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT 
DEFINED AMERICA 89 (2007) (quoting Justice Holmes as saying that he “loathe[d] the thick-fingered 
clowns we call the people”). 
16. The phrase comes from a book written by Justice Brandeis before his time on the Court. 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE‟S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 162 (1914). 
17. See generally Rosen, supra note 15. 
18. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg‟l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002). 
19. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
20. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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2010. In the 2008 Boumediene case, CAC‟s historical research on the 
extraterritorial application of the writ of habeas corpus in England was 
reflected in the opinion written by Justice Kennedy extending a form of 
habeas corpus to non-citizens at Guantanamo.21 
Finally, CAC‟s views were reflected in the most important ruling by a 
lower court in the health care case, Judge Silberman‟s opinion upholding 
the health care mandate for the D.C. Circuit.22 The Center filed a brief 
explaining why the text and history of the Commerce Clause supports the 
government‟s position23; Judge Silberman‟s opinion echoed CAC‟s view, 
with a startlingly definitive conclusion that the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution provides “no textual support” for the challenge to the health 
care mandate because “to „regulate‟ can mean to require action, and 
nothing in the definition appears to limit that power only to those already 
active in relation to an interstate market.”24 
As in the case of Chief Justice Roberts‟s decision to uphold the ACA, of 
course, it is impossible to prove that the relationship of the CAC‟s 
arguments to these liberal victories is one of causation rather than 
correlation. And not all of CAC‟s arguments have been successful: in a 
series of 5-4 decisions, the Roberts Court has ignored constitutional text 
and history when they don‟t suit the purposes of the conservative 
Justices.25 But in those cases, new textualist arguments have been useful in 
criticizing the conservatives for betraying their own principles. After the 
Citizens United decision,26 I testified with Kendall in a 2010 hearing held 
by Senator Patrick Leahy on the future of corporate spending in American 
elections.27 Drawing on a brief CAC had filed in the case28 that was 
echoed, if not cited, in Justice Stevens‟s partial dissent,29 Kendall 
convincingly traced the history of how corporations have been treated 
differently than people from the Founding through Reconstruction and the 
Progressive Era.30 The argument became enough of a meme that President 
 
21. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
22. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
23. Brief of Amicus Curiae Constitutional Accountability Center in Support of Appellees and 
Affirmance at 13-19, 26-28, Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d 1 (No. 11-5047). 
24. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 16. 
25. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007) (ignoring original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
26. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‟n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
27. See “We the People”? Corporate Spending in American Elections After Citizens United: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5-7 (2010) [hereinafter “We the 
People”?] (statement of Jeffrey Rosen, Professor of Law, George Washington University); id. at 10-
11 (statement of Douglas T. Kendall, President, Constitutional Accountability Center). 
28. Brief of the League of Women Voters of the United States and Constitutional Accountability 
Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 13-19, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205). 
29. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948-54 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
30. “We the People”?, supra note 27, at 10-11 (statement of Douglas T. Kendall, President, 
Constitutional Accountability Center). 
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Obama echoed it when he launched his 2012 campaign by declaring, 
“[C]orporations aren‟t people. People are people.”31 
II. THE NEW TEXTUALISM IN THEORY 
The reason that Kendall and CAC had no shortage of arguments about 
how the text and history of the Constitution point toward progressive 
results is that, during the past two decades, there has been an explosion of 
new textualist arguments in the legal academy on which the advocates 
were able to draw. The first intellectual guru of the new textualism was 
Akhil Reed Amar. In a series of articles,32 and in his book, America’s 
Constitution: A Biography,33 Amar has argued that by engaging 
conservatives on their own turf, liberals can show that many constitutional 
provisions are more in tune with progressive values than conservative 
ones. Rather than focusing narrowly on the original understanding of the 
constitutional Framers, as conservatives like Robert Bork at times do,34 
Amar has emphasized the importance of examining the original public 
meaning of the entire constitutional text, including the Progressive Era 
amendments.35 He stresses that these amendments, which the Tea Party 
ignores or wants to overturn, have expanded political participation for 
women and minorities, expanded Congress‟s power to enforce laws 
guaranteeing equality, and allowed for a progressive income tax.36 Amar 
has inspired a generation of younger scholars to do focused work on how 
individual clauses of the Constitution can lead to progressive results.37 
In the past decade, Amar has been joined as a new textualist leader by 
Balkin, whose new book, Living Originalism, offers a sustained synthesis 
of new textualist scholarship. It also includes creative arguments about 
how the original meaning of the constitutional text supports broad 
congressional power, the health care mandate, and the post-New Deal 
regulatory state, as well as much of the Warren and Burger Courts‟ civil 
rights and civil liberties jurisprudence. Like Amar, but unlike Justice 
Scalia, Balkin insists that the original meaning of the text should prevail 
over the original expectation of its framers, and that the application of the 
general principles embedded in the text can change over time.38 
 
31. See Amy Gardner & Felicia Sonmez, Obama Dings Romney’s “Corporations Are People” 
Line in Official Campaign Kickoff, WASH. POST, May 5, 2012, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-to-showcase-technology-at-kickoff-rallies-saturday/2012/05 
/05/gIQAZNA32T_story.html (quoting President Obama). 
32. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). 
33. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‟S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005). 
34. For a description of Bork‟s philosophy, see BALKIN, supra note 7, at 368 n.13. 
35. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 403-30 (discussing the Progressive Era reforms). 
36. See id. 
37. See, e.g., Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1073 (1991). 
38. See BALKIN, supra note 7, at 6-7 (contrasting his method with Justice Scalia‟s). 
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Despite its success in convincing judges and inspiring younger scholars, 
the new textualists have met fierce resistance in progressive academic 
circles. Some of the resistance is generational. Liberal scholars who came 
of age during the heyday of the Warren and Burger Courts and spent much 
of their careers fighting the originalism of Robert Bork view the embrace 
of constitutional text and history as a kind of capitulation to the enemy. 
For example, William Marshall, University of North Carolina professor, 
and Geoffrey Stone, University of Chicago professor and Chair of the 
American Constitution Society‟s Board of Directors, rejected the new 
textualism in a published debate with Kendall and Ryan. “[I]n the debate 
over constitutional meaning, liberals should not pretend that honest 
answers to vexing constitutional questions can be gleaned simply by 
staring hard at an ambiguous text,” they wrote.39 At a 2011 meeting of the 
American Constitution Society, Stone pressed his criticisms in a debate 
with Amar. “There are [textualist] theories underlying progressive 
activism, but they‟re not easy to explain,” he declared. “What Akhil 
[Amar] says may be true but try explaining it to the American people in a 
way that‟s compelling.” (Amar‟s populist response: “I think I just did. . . . 
I stand on the Constitution and not on fancy theories of adjudication.”40) 
Along the same lines, at the Yale conference on Living Originalism, there 
was resistance to Balkin‟s arguments by colleagues who defended living 
constitutionalism and expressed skepticism about the virtues of being 
tethered to the constitutional text.41 
There‟s an elephant in the room of the debate over the new textualism 
that explains much of the liberal legal establishment‟s skepticism: Roe v. 
Wade.42 The right to privacy doesn‟t appear in the text of the Constitution, 
and many liberal legal scholars and activists fear that Roe is hard to justify 
in textualist terms. It‟s true that Balkin‟s textualist defense of Roe is the 
least convincing part of his book. Though he argues that the right to 
choose abortion should be considered one of the privileges or immunities 
of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, he concedes that 
“[i]f we look only to state legislative action, the right to abortion had not 
yet gained the status of a privilege or immunity of national citizenship 
 
39. Geoffrey Stone & William Marshall, Geoffrey R. Stone and William P. Marshall Respond, 
DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS, Summer 2011, http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/stone-marshall 
-respond.php?page=all. 
40. See Text, History, and Principle: What Our Constitution Means and How To Interpret It (June 
18, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/news/video/text-history-principle-what-our-constitution-means-and 
-how-to-interpret-it. 
41. See, e.g., Justin Driver, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin, Does 
Originalism Have What Liberals Want? Panel Presentation at the Constitutional Interpretation and 
Change Conference at Yale Law School (Apr. 27, 2012); Neil S. Siegel, Professor of Law, Duke Law 
School, Jack Balkin‟s Rich Historicism and Diet Originalism: Health Benefits and Risks for the 
Constitutional System: Panel Presentation at the Constitutional Interpretation and Change Conference 
at Yale Law School (Apr. 27, 2012). 
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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when the Court decided Roe in 1973,”43 since only four states out of fifty 
had adopted the broad constitutional rule the Court imposed. Balkin is on 
stronger textualist ground when he argues that the right to choose abortion 
might be grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment‟s guarantee of equal 
citizenship for women, since restrictions on abortion force women to “take 
on the life-altering responsibilities and social obligations of motherhood,” 
denying them full sex equality.44 (Justice Ginsburg has persuaded her 
liberal colleagues on the Supreme Court to rethink Roe in similar terms.45) 
But at this point, any connection to the original meaning of the text is so 
attenuated that it is hard to distinguish Balkin‟s living originalism from 
Roe-style living constitutionalism. For this reason, Professor Michael W. 
McConnell of Stanford Law School criticized Balkin at the Living 
Originalism conference for being the mirror image of the conservative 
judicial activists he deplored—namely, for manipulating constitutional 
text and history in an effort to give partisan judges an excuse for second-
guessing democratic decisions.46 And to the degree that Balkin and other 
new textualists refuse to recognize that textualist arguments have their 
limits, and that not every liberal policy goal can be justified in 
constitutional terms, they diminish the new textualism‟s appeal as a 
principled framework for structuring political and legal debate. This free-
floating textualism also makes it harder to criticize conservatives for being 
similarly results-oriented when they manipulate the levels of abstraction of 
constitutional text and history in order to justify their own preferred 
policies. 
III. THE NEW TEXTUALISM IN PRACTICE 
At the Living Originalism Conference, Dean Robert Post of Yale Law 
School criticized Balkin for another reason. Post insisted that liberals 
should focus on defending progressive policies—such as healthcare—in 
substantive terms, rather than get distracted by debates about 
constitutional methodology.47 And he is correct that, when it comes to 
success as a Supreme Court Justice, what you believe in is more important 
than the constitutional methodology that you embrace to get there. Think 
of the different ideological wings that define liberalism today. There are 
 
43. BALKIN, supra note 7, at 216. 
44. Id. at 214. 
45. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
46. Michael W. McConnell, Richard and Frances Mallery Professor of Law, Stanford Law 
School, Originalism and Precedent: Panel Presentation at the Constitutional Interpretation and Change 
Conference at Yale Law School (Apr. 27, 2012). 
47. Robert C. Post, Dean, Yale Law School, Introductory Remarks at the Constitutional 
Interpretation and Change Conference at Yale Law School (Apr. 27, 2012). 
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Great Society liberals, who want to protect civil rights and the social 
safety net; there are mobilized subgroups who seek equality for women, 
gays and lesbians, and ethnic minorities; there are neo-progressives, such 
as Obama and his regulatory czar, Cass Sunstein, who want to promote a 
rational view of government through the rule of experts; there are civil 
liberties advocates, who care about free speech and privacy and their 
erosion by the Patriot Act; and there are economic populists, such as 
Elizabeth Warren and the Occupy Movement, who respect the rule of 
experts but have lots in common with the Tea Party in their distrust of 
Wall Street. 
During the Warren Court era, many of these different wings of 
liberalism were represented on the Supreme Court, and the Justices were 
eclectic in their constitutional methodologies. For example, Justices 
Douglas and Black were both libertarians and economic populists. As a 
matter of constitutional methodology, however, Justice Black was the 
patron saint of new textualism while Justice Douglas was the guru of 
living constitutionalism—both got to the same place, despite their 
methodological disagreements. 
Nevertheless, since the Clinton era, Democratic presidents have been 
more focused on appointing Supreme Court candidates based on their 
gleaming meritocratic resumes, combined with their symbolic value as 
icons of identity politics. Justice Ginsburg was the last liberal Justice 
appointed because of her connection to a substantive wing of the 
Democratic Party—the feminist movement. By contrast, all of her current 
liberal colleagues—Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—were 
appointed with little or no attention paid to what vision of liberalism they 
actually embrace. 
If President Obama cared more about the Court and the Constitution 
than he did during his first term, he would have to decide which wing of 
the Democratic Party he stands for and appoint Justices who would pursue 
those substantive goals. If he supported Occupy Wall Street, he would 
appoint economic populists like Warren. If, at heart, he is a neo-
progressive, then he would appoint his regulatory czar, Sunstein. Both 
Warren and Sunstein might embrace textualist arguments, but their 
textualism would be deployed in the service of their substantive 
constitutional vision. 
Here, Justice Brandeis is the model. When Justice Brandeis upheld laws, 
he didn‟t do so because of an abstract devotion to judicial restraint. Instead 
of suggesting that the American people and their representatives were 
entitled to their opinion in passing a particular law, he went on to argue 
that their opinion was supported by overwhelming evidence. Passionate 
defense of the people‟s judgment can also be found in Justice Brandeis‟s 
dissents in cases like Louis K. Liggett Co v. Lee, where he objected to the 
majority‟s decision to strike down an anti-chain store law in Florida that 
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was designed to protect small businesses.48 In addition to making the 
theoretical case for judicial restraint, Justice Brandeis reverently defended 
the American people‟s “widespread belief”49 that social and historical 
realities justified the Florida legislature‟s response to the “curse of 
bigness.”  
On the current Supreme Court, Justice Kagan struck a similarly 
Brandeisian note in her dissent from the Court‟s decision striking down 
Arizona‟s campaign finance laws in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.50 Justice Kagan, writing for the four liberal 
Justices, brushed away the formalistic smokescreens of the conservative 
Justices and defended the belief of the citizens of Arizona that their 
political system was corrupt and needed to be reformed. Justice Kagan 
called for:  
Less corruption, more speech. Robust campaigns leading to the 
election of representatives not beholden to the few, but accountable 
to the many. The people of Arizona might have expected a decent 
respect for those objectives. Today, they do not get it. . . . Truly, 
democracy is not a game.51 
The harder challenge is to defend the rightness of constitutional 
principles when you‟re striking down laws. Justice Brandeis did this in his 
greatest dissents and concurrences—such as those in Olmstead52 and 
Whitney53—by embracing a kind of living originalism. He began with the 
constitutional text and attributed constitutional principles to the Framers at 
a broad level of generality, but not so broad that the principles couldn‟t be 
plausibly tied to the Founding era. Justice Brandeis then translated those 
principles into the twentieth century in ways the Framers couldn‟t have 
imagined. 
A neo-Brandeisian approach today could draw on new textualist briefs 
about how constitutional history favors a result protecting free speech or 
privacy. But in the end, Justice Brandeis‟s dissents were great not because 
he channeled what the Framers thought about modern technologies but 
because he proposed concrete and creative ways of translating the First 
and Fourth Amendments that the Framers couldn‟t possibly have 
imagined. On the lower courts, Chief Judge Kozinski is doing this today in 
privacy cases.54 But it requires not only an invocation of constitutional text 
 
48. 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. at 580 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
50. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 2846. 
52. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
53. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
54. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring); see also United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
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and history but a creative, Brandeisian leap that fashions new tests for 
protecting privacy in the face of technologies the Framers couldn‟t have 
foreseen.  
All this suggests that the new textualism may provide a useful rhetorical 
framework for liberal Justices to pursue their substantive goals, but it‟s no 
substitute for the substantive goals themselves. Still, the fact that the new 
textualism is broad enough to embrace all the different strands of legal 
liberalism increases its strategic appeal: as a big tent, it allows liberals to 
focus on substance rather than squabbling about methodolgy. That is, after 
all, what conservatives have recognized. There are three different strains 
of legal conservatism currently represented on the Roberts Court: the pro-
executive power conservatives, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and 
Justice Scalia; the libertarian, Justice Kennedy; and the Tea Party 
conservative, Justice Thomas.55 But despite their ideological differences, 
all three of these camps have been willing to converge under the banner of 
constitutional text and history, which has solidified their ability to act as a 
partisan block. The liberal Justices, who have less clearly defined 
ideological commitments, might be better able to coordinate their 
opposition and to criticize the conservatives on their own terms if they 
learned the same lesson. 
By advocating the new textualism, of course, Balkin hopes to encourage 
progressives to change the political rather than simply the legal debate. 
“Framework originalism is not an algorithm for correct decision,” he 
writes. “It is a platform for ordinary legal argument about the 
Constitution. . . . [F]ramework originalism . . . describes a framework for 
politics and a framework for legal arguments to construct the 
Constitution.”56 
It‟s true that whatever success the Tea Party has had reflects its ability 
to mobilize citizens to march on the Washington Mall carrying copies of 
the Constitution. Indeed, every major political agenda item on the right 
over the past few decades has been rooted in a story about the 
Constitution‟s text and history—from the attack on gun control, rooted in 
the Second Amendment,57 and the attack on environmental law, rooted in 
the Fifth Amendment,58 to the attack on Obamacare, rooted in the Tenth 
Amendment.59 
During the Civil Rights movement, as Kendall argues, progressives 
 
55. See Jeffrey Rosen, Disorder in the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 2011, http://www.tnr.com 
/article/politics/magazine/90549/legal-conservatism-supreme-court-epstein-scalia-originalism-judicial 
-restraint. 
56. BALKIN, supra note 7, at 257 (emphasis removed). 
57. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Why Are 
Conservatives, Not Liberals, Fixated on Amending the Constitution?, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 18, 2011, 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/86905/constitution-amendment-conservatives-united-states. 
58. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
59. See Nat‟l Fed‟n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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were effective in claiming the Constitution as their own and using it to 
advance their agenda of expanding equality. In recent years, by contrast, 
they have shied away from making political arguments in constitutional 
terms. Even on the subject of marriage equality, President Obama 
explained his change of heart in moral rather than constitutional terms: by 
insisting that the states should be able to decide the issue on their own, he 
has committed himself to the position that there is no federal constitutional 
right to gay marriage.60 
CONCLUSION 
Balkin and other new textualists have made an invaluable contribution 
by urging progressives to frame their political arguments in constitutional 
terms, and to invoke the text of the Constitution as a sword rather than a 
shield. But, as Balkin recognizes, constitutional methodology will never 
be a substitute for political vision. To transform the policy debate, 
progressives of all stripes—from economic populists and neo-progressives 
to civil libertarians and advocates of racial, gender, and marriage 
equality— need to incite ordinary citizens to mobilize politically on behalf 
of shared values. As President Obama recognized in The Audacity of 
Hope, political change comes from the grassroots up61: only after 
progressives succeed in transforming the political debate by winning the 
hearts and minds of mobilized subgroups can they transform the legal 
debate as well. In this sense, the new textualism cannot precipitate the next 
progressive revolution; but it may be useful in preserving its legislative 
victories after they occur. 
 
 
60. See Peter Wallsten & Scott Wilson, For Obama, Gay Marriage Stance Born of a Long 
Evolution, WASH. POST, May 10, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-10/politics 
/35456048_1_gay-marriage-stance-gay-donors-marriage-rights. 
61. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN 
DREAM 79 (2006). 
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